

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 095686 TOSEC 100106

62

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:AR DAY:TH

APPROVED BY P:JJSISCO

NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.

S/S - MR. BORG

----- 020944

Z 202157Z APR 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY FLASH

S E C R E T STATE 095686 TOSEC 100106

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SISCO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, LE, EG, US

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: MESSAGE TO SADAT AND FAHMY
ON LEBANON (S/S NO.7608283

1. THE FOLLOWING FOR YOUR APPROVAL IS A TELEGRAM TO
CAIRO CONTAINING A MESSAGE FOR FAHMY AND SADAT. THIS
MESSAGE CONSTITUTES THE ANALYSIS OF THE LEBANESE PROBLEM
THAT WE HAVE PROMISED THE EGYPTIANS. AS YOU WILL SEE,
WE HAVE SOUGHT TO ASSESS THE LEBANESE SITUATION PRIMARILY
AS IT RELATES TO AND AFFECTS THE BROADER NEGOTIATING
EFFORT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR VIEWS ON THE LEBANESE
PROBLEM ITSELF HAVE LARGELY BEEN CONVEYED TO THE EGYPTIANS,
MOST RECENTLY IN THE TELEGRAM YOU APPROVED YESTERDAY.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

SECRET

IMMEDIATE CAIRO

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 095686 TOSEC 100106

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, LE, EG, US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO SADAT AND FAHMY ON LEBANON

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANALYSIS OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION THAT WE TOLD SADAT AND FAHMY WE WOULD BE SENDING THEM. YOU SHOULD CONVEY IT TO SADAT THROUGH FAHMY.

IN CONSIDERING AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE LEBANESE SITUATION AS IT HAS DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST YEAR, AND IN DETERMINING THE STEPS WE HAVE TAKEN WITH RESPECT TO IT, WE HAVE BEEN CONSCIOUS FIRST AND FOREMOST OF THE NEED TO PREVENT ITS INTERFERING WITH OUR LONGER-RUN GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. AS SADAT AND FAHMY ARE AWARE, WE PLAN MAJOR EFFORT IN 1977 TO MOVE TOWARD AN OVERALL MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, WITH SOME DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY THIS YEAR TO LAY GROUNDWORK AND KEEP PROCESS ALIVE AND GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED (INCLUDING SYRIA) ENGAGED. PRESIDENT SADAT HAS UNDERSTOOD LIMITS ON OUR ABILITY TO MOVE MATTERS FORWARD DECISIVELY THIS YEAR, JUST AS WE HAVE UNDERSTOOD NEED TO KEEP ALIVE CREDIBLE PROSPECT THAT SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT WILL BE ACHIEVED NEXT YEAR AND TO GIVE EVIDENCE OF THIS--AS WE HAVE IN RESISTING SUPPLEMENTARY CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION FOR ISRAEL AND IN PUBLICLY TAKING ISSUE WITH ISRAELI OCCUPATION POLICIES.

WE HAVE FROM THE BEGINNING LOOKED TO PRESIDENT SADAT FOR LEADERSHIP ON THE ARAB SIDE OF THIS DIFFICULT BUT VITAL PROCESS. HIS STATESMANSHIP AND COURAGE SET THE DIRECTION FOR ALL THE ARAB COUNTRIES WITH THE SINAI AGREEMENT OF 1975 AND THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WHICH IT ENTAILED. WITH THE CONCLUSION OF THAT AGREEMENT, WE TURNED TO THE TASK OF MAINTAINING THE MOMENTUM THAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED. AS PRESIDENT FORD AND I HAVE MADE CLEAR ON MANY OCCASIONS, STALEMATE AND STAGNATION IN THIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 095686 TOSEC 100106

PROCESS COULD NOT BE TOLERATED SINCE THIS WAS A SITUATION THAT COULD NOT STAND STILL; IF WE DID NOT MOVE FORWARD, CAPITALIZING ON AND EXPANDING THE GAINS MADE BY THE EGYPTIAN MOVE, THE WHOLE SITUATION WOULD DETERIORATE.

AS THE LEBANESE CRISIS HAS DEVELOPED DURING THE PAST YEAR, WE HAVE ENDEAVORED TO ANALYZE HOW IT RELATED TO THIS PRIMARY GOAL OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT AND HOW IT COULD

AFFECT THE POSSIBILITIES OF REACHING THAT GOAL. WE WOULD MUCH APPRECIATE THE ASSESSMENT OF SADAT AND FAHMY ON THIS POINT, SINCE EGYPT HAS SUCH A DIRECT AND VITAL STAKE IN THE ISSUE. TO US IT APPEARED THAT THE LEBANESE CRISIS COULD AFFECT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR LARGER GOALS IN A

NUMBER OF WAYS. IF THE FACTIONAL FIGHTING CONTINUED, AND NO SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED, IT SEEMED ALL TOO LIKELY THAT SOONER OR LATER THE CONFLICT WOULD SPREAD BEYOND THE BORDERS OF LEBANON. ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT HAS FREQUENTLY BEEN NOTED IN ANALYSES OF THE LEBANESE DOMESTIC STRUGGLE IS THAT MOST OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE BEEN INVOLVED AND THAT SOME BROADER MIDDLE EAST DISPUTES HAVE BEEN REFLECTED IN THIS ESSENTIALLY LOCAL CONFLICT. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN HAS BEEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT SYRIA AND ISRAEL WOULD BOTH INTERVENE WITH MILITARY FORCE, SETTING IN MOTION DEVELOPMENTS THAT WOULD LEAD TO A BROADER REGIONAL WAR.

IT ALSO SEEMED POSSIBLE THAT, EVEN WHERE A SOLUTION WERE FOUND FOR THE DOMESTIC DISPUTE, THE NATURE OF THE SOLUTION COULD HAVE BROADER CONSEQUENCES. WE HAVE RECOGNIZED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT IF SYRIA IMPOSED A SETTLEMENT BY MOVING IN HEAVILY POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY, THE POSITION OF DOMINATION THAT DAMASCUS MIGHT ACHIEVE IN LEBANON WOULD CONSTITUTE A NEW FACTOR IN THE MIDDLE EAST THAT COULD COMPLICATE FURTHER MOVEMENT UNDER EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP TOWARD A REGIONAL PEACE SETTLEMENT.

AS THE LEBANESE FIGHTING PROGRESSED, IT APPEARED TO US THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES GREW. THE INSTITUTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF LEBANESE LIFE THAT EXERCISED A MODERATING ROLE GRADUALLY ERODED. MOST SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 095686 TOSEC 100106

RECENTLY, EVEN THE SECURITY FORCES AND THE ARMY DISSOLVED. THE FACTIONS CONFRONTING EACH OTHER NO LONGER SEEMED TO US TO HAVE ANY COMMON GROUND, AND WE WERE CONCERNED AT INDICATIONS THAT THEY MORE AND MORE CAME TO BELIEVE THAT ONLY A MILITARY VICTORY COULD SECURE THEIR PARTICULAR AIMS.

OUR EFFORTS THROUGH THE END OF LAST YEAR WERE TO ENCOURAGE A SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE AMONG ALL FACTIONS AND TO MAKE SURE THAT ALL OF THEM UNDERSTOOD THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION LAY IN MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION. EARLY THIS YEAR IT BECAME INCREASINGLY EVIDENT THAT THE FACTIONS WERE UNABLE TO ACHIEVE SUCH ACCOMMODATION BY THEIR OWN EFFORTS, AND WERE THEMSELVES TURNING INCREASINGLY TOWARD SYRIAN MEDIATION TO PROVIDE A POLITICAL BASIS ON WHICH

THEY MIGHT BE ABLE TO AGREE. WE RECOGNIZED THAT SUCH SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT, AT LEBANESE INVITATION, WAS A FACT OF LIFE WE COULD NOT IN ANY CASE PREVENT, AND WE THEREFORE ADOPTED A STRATEGY OF SEEKING TO CONTAIN IT. WE HOPED THAT BY SUPPORTING THE EARLY ACHIEVEMENT OF A SOLUTION WE COULD KEEP SUCH INVOLVEMENT TO A MINIMUM. IN PARTICULAR, WE HOPED TO PREVENT ANY SYRIAN MILITARY

INTERVENTION.

IN THIS WE WERE ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL. SOME OF THE FACTIONS WERE AGREEABLE TO THE POLITICAL PROPOSALS, BUT OTHERS SAW ADVANTAGE TO THEMSELVES IN FURTHER HOSTILITIES. THIS LED, AS WE HAD FEARED IT WOULD, TO THE BEGINNINGS OF SYRIAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT. WE PRESSED HARD IN DAMASCUS TO DISCOURAGE THIS, AND WE BELIEVE OUR EFFORTS SUCCEEDED IN KEEPING IT LIMITED, RESULTING IN GROWING STRAINS BETWEEN SYRIA AND OURSELVES. IN A RECENT MEETING WITH VISITING U.S. SENATORS, ASAD WAS VERY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. ROLE, STATING THAT WE WERE AGAINST SYRIAN INTERVENTION AND WERE TRYING TO PREVENT IT. WE ALSO PRESSED THE ISRAELIS TO REFRAIN FROM INTERVENING, BECAUSE ISRAELI COUNTERMOVEMENT ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE LED TO A REGIONAL CONFLICT. WE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN THIS EFFORT WITH THE ISRAELIS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 095686 TOSEC 100106

WE HAVE OF COURSE TRIED TO ASSESS THROUGHOUT THIS PERIOD THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN LEBANON, AND WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN EGYPT'S THOUGHTS AND INFORMATION ON THIS SCORE. WE HAVE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SOVIETS WERE TAKING AN UNHELPFUL BUT NOT MAJOR PART IN EVENTS THERE. THEY HAVE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT THE RELATIVELY SMALL COMMUNIST PARTY AS AN ELEMENT OF THE RADICAL LEFT THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE CONTINUING INSTABILITY, BUT WE ASSUMED THE SOVIETS WERE SOMEWHAT LIMITED IN THE ROLE THEY COULD PLAY ON THE LEFT BY THE FACT THAT SYRIA FOUND ITSELF OPPOSING THE LEBANESE LEFT. AS SADAT AND FAHMY KNOW, IN REPLYING TO THE RECENT SOVIET NOTE CONCERNING OUR NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN WE CALLED ON MOSCOW TO EXERCISE A RESTRAINING INFLUENCE OVER THE FACTION IT SUPPORTED. WE HAVE ALSO VIEWED OUR NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE AREA AS A WARNING TO THE SOVIET UNION NOT TO INTERFERE IN ANY MORE OVERT WAY IN LEBANON.

THERE NOW SEEMS TO BE SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD POLITICAL COMPROMISE IN LEBANON AND A GREATER WILLINGNESS AMONG THE FACTIONS TO ACCEPT A POLITICAL AS AGAINST A MILITARY DECISION. WE HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT ARAFAT, WITH THE

RELATIVELY STRONG POSITION THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE
ACHIEVED IN LEBANON DURING THE FIGHTING, HAS HAD AN
IMPORTANT ROLE IN WORKING OUT A BASIS FOR THE CONTINUA-
TION OF THE CEASEFIRE. IF THE PRESENT TREND CONTINUES,
WE BELIEVE THAT THE LEBANESE DISPUTE CAN BE KEPT AT A
LEVEL WHERE IT WILL NOT HAVE SERIOUSLY DAMAGING EFFECTS
ON PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN THE AREA AND FURTHER SYRIAN
INTERVENTION CAN BE AVOIDED. WE WILL THEN BE ABLE,

WITH CONTINUING EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP, TO MOVE FORWARD
AGAIN IN NEGOTIATION OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT.
SYRIAN DOMINATION OF LEBANON WILL HAVE BEEN AVOIDED
WITHOUT AT THE SAME TIME EXPOSING THE COUNTRY TO TOTAL
CHAOS AND ABSENCE OF INTERNAL ORDER. IF WE ARE NOT SO
FORTUNATE, HOWEVER, AND A LEBANESE POLITICAL SOLUTION
CONTINUES TO EVADE US, THE DILEMMAS WE FACE WILL
PRESENT THEMSELVES WITH RENEWED FORCE. WE WOULD LIKE
THE ASSESSMENT OF SADAT AND FAHMY AS TO THE BEST COURSE
TO FOLLOW IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES TO REDUCE THE CHANCES
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 095686 TOSEC 100106

THAT LEBANESE INSTABILITY WILL DAMAGE OUR COMMON EFFORT
TOWARD A SETTLEMENT.

END TEXT.

3. RECOMMENDATION:

THAT YOU APPROVE THE RECOMMENDED MESSAGE TO CAIRO.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

4. DRAFTED: NEA:AR DAY

APPROVED: P:JJSISCO

CLEARANCES: NEA:ALATHERTON, JR.

S/S -

ROBINSON

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, TEXT, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, INTERVENTION, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, PEACE PLANS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, POLITICAL SITUATION, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, CAT-C
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 APR 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ShawDG
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE095686
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: ARDAY:TH
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840104-2118
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760442/aaaabjlc.tel
Line Count: 265
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ShawDG
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <05 MAY 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <02 SEP 2004 by ShawDG>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ACTION MEMORANDUM: MESSAGE TO ADAT AND FAHMY ON LEBANON
TAGS: PFOR, PSDC, US, LE, EG, XF, (SADAT, ANWAR), (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (FAHMY, ISMAIL)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006